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I. INTRODUCTION
Currently, the United States Forest Service is engaged in a program
of long range planning for the units of the National Forest System. Several
congressional enactments of the past decade have directed the Forest
Service to conduct the most extensive review and planning in its history,
and possibly in the history of any federal land management agency. The
holdings of the Forest Service are substantial, approaching 190 million
acres in 154 National Forests and 19 National Grasslands.' The decisions
made as to the use of these lands involve potentially irretrievable committ-
ments of particular resource values. Because of this, and the contempora-
neous effect of allocations made, it is imperative that the wisest of possible
decisions be made.
The most visible manifestation of this process to the public has been
the continual solicitation by the Forest Service of "public comment" on
draft and supplemental Forest Plans. The statutory requirement that the
agency consult the public during the decisionmaking period2 is relatively
new, resulting primarily from citizen pressures to "open up" the govern-
mental process. Recently, the Forest Service, charged by statute to
promulgate regulations guiding the procedure and use of public input
during the planning process, revised those regulations. Most significant of
the revisions as they pertained to public participation in the planning
process was the deletion of a previously included regulatory clause stating
that the intent of such activities was, in part, to demonstrate that public
issues were considered and evaluated in that process." Additionally, the
revised regulations, coupled with the policy of the present Administration,
place a greater emphasis on "economic" criteria in the forest planning
process.5
* Master's candidate, Dept. of Agricultural Economics & Economics, Montana State Univer-
sity; B.S., Natural Resource Economics, Montana State University, 1982.
** Second-year law student, University of Montana Law School; B.A., Political Science,
Montana State University, 1980.
1. The United States Government Manual 119 (1982-83).
2. See infra notes 27, 28 and accompanying text.
3. See infra notes 15-20 and accompanying text.
4. See infra note 36 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 69,93 and accompanying text. See also 47 Fed. Reg. 43033,43047 (1982), 36
C.F.R. § 219.14(c)(d) (1982).
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The increased emphasis on economics, and the apparent weakening of
the regulatory prescription for public participation, provide good reasons
for a wide-ranging inquiry into several areas pertinent to public land
management policy. In general, statutory directives guiding management
activity, implementation of those directives, and the public's role in agency
accountability from the social and legal perspectives will be explored. The
particular aim is to examine the traditional management policies of the
Forest Service, how those practices fit in with the demand for greater
accountability, and consequently the affirmative, reactive role that the
agency must play in being held accountable. This Article examines in
different contexts the "why" of public participation, and in particular the
function it plays in the structure of federal land management.
Recognizing the inability of traditional democratic structures to deal
adequately with the specifics of the complex land management process and
the reality of necessary discretion, and recognizing the bureaucratic
context in which such decisions must be made, the authors believe that a
strong model of public participation should be fostered and protected.
II. STATUTORY BACKGROUND
The Forest and Rangeland Renewable Resources Planning Act of
19746 (RPA) requires the Forest Service to conduct resource assessments
and inventories for all units of the National Forest System. The National
Forest Management Act7 (NFMA), enacted in 1976, in amending RPA,
directs the Forest Service to promulgate plans for the management of each
National Forest in accordance with the assessments and inventories of
RPA. Together, these two statutes pose a formidable task for the Forest
Service. But this task is further complicated by the requirement that the
procedures utilized and plans developed comply with the National Envi-
ronmental Policy Act of 19698 (NEPA) and the Multiple Use-Sustained
Yield Act of 1960 (MU-SY).
NFMA contains several provisions mandating public participation in
the planning process. Section 6 (d) of the Act directs the Forest Service to
"provide for public participation in the development, review and revision of
all land management plans, and to hold public meetings, or comparable
processes, in locations that foster public participation."1 Additionally,
section 6(g)(1) requires that the Forest Service promulgate regulations
guiding the planning process, and that such regulations comply with
6. Pub.L.No. 93-378, 88 Stat. 476 (1974), 16 U.S.C. §§ 1600-1610 (as amended) (1976).
7. Pub.L.No. 94-588, 90 Stat. 2949 (1976), 16 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1614 (1976).
8. Pub.L.No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (1970), 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321,4331-4335,4341-4347 (1976).
9. Pub.L.No. 86-517, 74 Stat. 215 (1960), 16 U.S.C. §§ 528-531 (1976).
10. 16 U.S.C. § 1604(d) (1976).
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NEPA, 1a which itself provides for public hearings and comments on
actions.12 Those regulations were first established on September 17,
1979,13 and have governed the process until the recent revisions.-
4
Shortly after taking office, President Ronald Reagan made good on
one of his promises to bring about reform in government. By Executive
Order 12291 15 the "Presidential Task Force on Regulatory Reform" was
established for the purpose of examining new and existing regulations to
"reduce the regulatory burden, increase agency accountabil-
ity. . .minimize duplication, and assure well reasoned regulations."'" The
Task Force acted quickly, notifying the Department of Agriculture (the
"parent" department of the Forest Service) on March 9, 1981, that the
NFMA regulations were high priority items for review and revision.17 The
Forest Service began such a review, and on February 22, 1981, issued a
draft of proposed revisions.' 8 These proposals were subject to public
comment and review by a panel of consultants.' 9 After the review and
comment process the final, and now-effective, regulations were issued on
September 30, 1982.20
In the planning process the Forest Service must identify a range of
alternative allocations of use21 along a spectrum of resource values
identified in MU-SY.2 2 The previous NFMA regulations required that this
11. 16 U.S.C. § 1604(g)(1) (1976).
12. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4361 (1976).
13. 44 Fed. Reg. 53928, 36 C.F.R. § 219 (1980).
14. The 1979 regulations were superceded by the regulations published in 47 Fed. Reg. 43026
(1982).
15. Exec. Order No. 12291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13193 (1981).
16. Id.
17. Letter from James C. Miller III to James Barnes, General Counsel Designate, U.S. Dept. of
Agriculture (Mar. 9, 1981).
18. 47 Fed. Reg. 7678 (1982).
19. Meeting on National Forest Management Act Proposed Regulation, June 30-July 2, 1982,
Westpark Hotel, Rosslyn, Virginia. At this meeting, Assistant Secretary of Agriculture John Crowell
reemphasized the intent of the "Task Force" in stating that the revisions were to (in pertinent part)
"clarify the language and shorten if possible", and "remove material that seemed inappropriate for
regulations, i.e., philosophical rather than regulatory, or more appropriate for other regulations or
intra-agency directives." Opening Remarks of John Crowell, Assistant Secretary of Agriculture,
Meeting on the Planning Regulation Revisions, June 30-July 2, 1982.
20. 47 Fed. Reg. 43026 (1982).
21. The Plans must be prepared in accordance with NEPA, (16 U.S.C. §§ 1604(g) (1976),
which provides that "alternatives to the proposed action" be included in every recommendation. (42
U.S.C. §§ 4332(c)(iii) (1976). For the purposes of this discussion the assumption is made that all
Forest Plans are "major Federal actions" according to NEPA guidelines (42 U.S.C. §§ 4332(c)
(1976).
22. 16 U.S.C. § 1604(e). MU-SY states that "It is the policy of the Congress that the national
forests are established and shall be administered for outdoor recreation, range, timber, and wildlife and
fish purposes." 16 U.S.C. § 528 (1976).
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range of alternatives be "reasonable, '2 3 and the new ones require a "broad
range of reasonable alternatives".24 This requirement of reasonableness is
a cornerstone of NEPA policy and has a strong footing in case law.2 5 It is at
this stage of the planning process that the greatest amount of agency
discretion is extant. Although constrained by this reasonableness require-
ment, the Forest Service, in its position of relative informational advan-
tage, has the capacity to "set the stage" and thus exercise a comparatively
greater ability to influence the end result.
The public participation-comment process is, from the stand point of
individual participants, where the discretion of the agency is subject to the
most direct control. Both NEPA (generally) 6 and NFMA (specifically) 27
require the Forest Service to solicit and respond to public opinion in the
23. 36 C.F.R. 219.5(f) (1982).
24. 47 Fed. Reg. 43045, 36 C.F.R. § 219.12(0, (effective November 1, 1982).
25. "[T]he range of alternatives considered by an agency is governed by a 'rule of reason' that
requires an agency to set forth only those alternatives necessary to permit a 'reasoned choice.' Save
Lake Washington v. Frank, 641 F.2d 1330, 1334 (9th Cir. 1981); Life of The Land v. Brinager, 485
F.2d 460,472 (9th Cir. 1973) cert. denied, 416 U.S. 961 (1974). An EIS, however, need not consideran
alternative 'whose effect cannot be reasonably ascertained, and whose implementation is deemed
remote and speculative.' Id." California v. Block, 690 F.2d 753 (9th Cir. 1982). The Supreme Court
has recently reminded lower courts that they are not free to impose stricter procedures on agencies than
those contained in the statutes, and the concept of alternatives must be bounded by "feasibility",
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council Inc., 435 U.S. 519
(1978). See also Hill & Ortolano, NEPA's Effect on the Consideration of Alternatives: A Crucial
Test, 18 NAT. RESOURCES J. 285 (1981).
26. The Council on Environmental Quality guidelines, established pursuant to NEPA state at
40 C.F.R. § 1506.6 (1982) that
"Agencies shall: (a) Make diligent efforts to involve the public in preparing and
implementing their NEPA procedures,. . .(c) Hold or sponsor public hearings or public
meetings whenever appropriate or in accordance with the statutory requirements applicable
to the agency. Criteria shall include whether there is: (1) Substantial environmental
controversy concerning the proposed action or substantial interest in holding the hearing;
(2) A request for a hearing by another agency with jurisdiction over the action supported by
reasons why the hearing will be helpful,. . .(d) Solicit appropriate information from the
public."
The CEQ guidelines are advisory, but the Supreme Court, in Andrews v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. at 358
(1978), declared that they are "entitled to substantial deference" in interpreting and implementing
NEPA.
27. 16 U.S.C. 1604(d)(f)(4), (g)(3)(f)(iv), (m)(2). The controlling provision of the Act in
regards to participation in the general planning process is: "(d) Public participation in management
plans; availability of plans; public meetings.
The Secretary shall provide for public participation in the development, review, and
revision of land management plans including, but not limited to, making the plans or
revisions available to the public at convenient locations in thevicinity of the affected unit for
a period of at least three months before final adoption, during which period the Secretary
shall publicize and hold public meetings or comparable processes at locations that foster
public participation in the review of such plans or revisions."
The other provisions require the same participation in: revisions of plans, (f)(d); in instances of
departures from theestablished harvest schedule, (g)(3)(f)(iv), (m)(2), and 16 U.S.C. § 1161 requires
public participation for and departure from evenflow-non-declining yield limit on timber sales.
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planning proposals. The importance of this process is reflected in the
response to the Forest Service's initial proposals. The original regulations
contained a comprehensive explanation of the role of participation in the
planning process.2 8 The Proposed Regulations condensed that into the
brief statement that "[p]ublic participation throughout the planning
process is encouraged," 29 while retaining only the statement that "[t]he
primary purpose of public participation is to broaden the information base
upon which planning decisions are made." 30
The deletions were defended by the view that the requirements of the
original regulations were "more explanatory than directional," that "they
[the regulations] were already referenced to NEPA, and that the deleted
material would be transferred to the Forest Service Manual."31 The
proposed revisions were poorly received by the public. 2 The Panel of
Consultants recommended that either the original regulations, or a
different proposed set of regulations (of June 30, 1982),'$ both substan-
tially similar, were preferable to the Forest Service proposals.34 In the
Final Rule, the Forest Service reinstated most of the language of the
original regulations. Omitted as redundant was the clause that stated the
purpose of public participation was to "broaden the information base on
which planning decisions are made." 5 Most significant, however, is that
the fifth statement of intent of the original regulations, that public
participation "demonstrate that public issues and input are considered and
28. 36 C.F.R. § 219.7 (1982).
"(a) Because the land and resource management planning process determines how the lands
of the National Forests System are to be managed, the public is encouraged to participate
throughout the planning process. The intent of public participation is to: (1) Ensure that the
Forest Service understands the needs and concerns of the public; (2) Inform the public of
Forest Service land and resource planning activities; (3) Provide the public with an
understanding of Forest Service programs and proposed actions; (4) Broaden the informa-
tion base upon which land and resource management planning decisions are made; and (5)
Demonstrate that public issues and input are considered and evaluated in reaching planning
decisions.", and "(f) The primary purpose of public participation is to broaden the
information base upon which planning decisions are made."
29. 47 Fed. Reg. 7684, § 219.6(a) (1982).
30. This was 219.7(0 in the original regulation, renumbered as 219.6(e) in the Forest Service
proposals. See supra note 18.
31. C. Hartgraves, Summary Report of Forest Service and Panel of Consultants on Proposed
Revision of NFMA Regulations. See supra note 19. See also Analysis of Public Comment, 47 Fed.
Reg. at 43029 (1982).
32. Id.
33. Draft Language Prepared by Land Management Planning Staff for Discussion, June 30,
1982; Review of NFMA Land and Resource Management Planning Regulations. (Available from
Forest Service.)
34. Comments of the Committee of Scientists, letter from Arthur W. Cooper, Head of
Department of Forestry, North Carolina State University, to R. Max Peterson, Chief, U.S. Forest
Service, USDA, July 26, 1982.
35. See supra note 30.
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evaluated in reaching planning decisions" 6 was deleted for no articulated
reason. This clause was the strongest and most substantive of the five
original guidelines. On inquiry, this deletion was defended because the
clause "was considered unnecessary, somewhat inaccurate, and non-
regulatory in nature", and that:
[P]ublic participation in itself does not 'demonstrate that
public issues and values are considered and evaluated in reaching
planning decisions.' The results of the planning process, as
recorded in the Forest plans, environmental impact statements,
and the planning records should reflect and demonstrate the
importance of public issues and values. While Forest Service
public participation activities do demonstrate a desire to inform
or be informed, that is not the intent. The primary intent of these
activities is an information exchange which will facilitate plan-
ning and management of the National Forests.3 7
Although correct in the strictest semantic sense-that the results of
the planning process, and not the process itself, demonstrate the effect of
public comment-the general weight of input on the proposed regulations
indicated the desirability of including a guideline of this type." Perhaps a
response preferable to non-inclusion would have been to relocate the
provision in a section where it would have been more technically accurate.
It is doubtful, however, that any relocation would lead to greater accuracy
because of the fact that 36 C.F.R. § 219.6 is the general regulation
promulgated under NFMA89 dealing with public participation in the
planning process, and thus would seem the most logical place for a
regulation of this type. The regulations do refer to compliance with NEPA
in this respect,40 but with NFMA's specific directive to the Secretary of
Agriculture to "promulgate regulations," and "specify procedures to
insure that land management plans are prepared in accordance with
[NEPA],"'41 it is questionable whether a mere reference to NEPA is
sufficient. Additionally, NEPA case law sets forth a minimum requirement
that the decisionmaking process demonstrates the consideration and effect
of valid public input, and challenges the perception that public input is
simply an information exchange.4 2
36. 36 C.F.R. § 219.7(a)(5) (1982).
37. Letter from C. Hargraves, Director, Land Management Planning, U.S. Forest Service, to
Harley Harris (December 28, 1982).
38. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
39. See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text.
40. 36 C.F.R. § 319.10, 47 Fed. Reg. at 43043 (1982), (effective November 1, 1982).
41. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1604(g)(1) (1976).
42. See infra notes 166-172. 205, and accompanying text.
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III. PARTICIPATION IN THE FOREST SERVICE CONTEXT
A. Historical Background
The Forest Service has a tradition of being one of the most insular and
independent of the federal bureaucracies. The most accurate characteriza-
tion of this traditional role has been that of the manager and steward of the
public forest domain. The reforms of NEPA, directives of NFMA, and
other legislation of the past several decades have implicitly led to a
redefinition of this role-from that of manager to that of administrator. 43
Government policy for the nation's forests has gone through several
eras; running the gamut from disposition to retention to multiple-use
management." Goals of government policy for the first century of the
Union were that of disposal of those lands to the private sector.45 Late in the
last century, a concern for the abuse of the forests and of the various land
disposal laws brought about an affirmative interest in natural resource
conservation.48 Policy at that time shifted away from disposal to retention
and reservation,47 and was heavily influenced by the European model,
where the emphasis was on the scientific management of forests for their
resource (primarily timber) value.48 Values of recreation and aestetics
were heavily discounted relative to contemporary perceptions.
The bulk of Forest Service activity during these first few decades was
not production. Sufficient timber still existed within private hands to meet
current demands; as a result foresters were involved primarily in conserva-
43. Conversation with Dr. Richard Shannon, Professor of Forestry, University of Montana
School of Forestry, Missoula, Montana (Feb. 23, 1983). See also Osthemer, The Forest Service Meets
the Public: Decisionmaking and Public Involvement on the Coconmo National Forest (March 1977)
(Eisenhower Consortium Bulletin 5, Eisenhower Consortium for Western Environmental Forestry
Research).
44. It is not the authors' purpose to explore fully the Forest Service's history. Interested readers
would do well by referring to any of the following works: G. ROBINSON, THE FOREST SERVICE: A STUDY
IN PUBLIC LAND MANAGEMENT (1975); D. BARNEY, THE LAST STAND (1974); Huffman, A History of
Forest Policy in the United States, 8 ENVTL. L. 239 (1977).
45. ROnNSON, supra note 44, at 3. Efforts to preserve the forests at this time were seen as anti-
development, and thus the government only engaged in selective protection of trees vital to trade and
defense.
46. Id. at 5; Huffman, supra note 44, at 256.
47. The Act of March 3, 1981, (commonly known as the Forest Service "Organic Act") Chap.
561 § 24m 26 Stat. 1103 § 24 (891), as amended 16 U.S.C. §§ 471 (1976), gave the President power to
set aside land "covered with timber."
48. The most influential forester of this era was Gifford Pinchot. He viewed forestry as a
practical agricultural science, and his philosophies and policies set the tone that the Forest Service has,
to a great extent, followed to this day. ROBINSON, supra note 44, at 9. Nevertheless, Pinchot is also
viewed as a founder and mentor of the modern conservation movement. What is important about his
philosophy, according to Huffman, supra note 44, at 268, was that its "approach to resource
management met current needs without destroying future options." Statutorily, the Forest Manage-
ment Act of 1897, Chap. 2, 30 Stat. 35, as amended 16 U.S.C. §§ 424, gave direction to manage the
reservations to furnish timber, protect watersheds, and otherwise improve or protect them.
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tion work.49 The New Deal and World War II era had several effects on the
National Forest System. These years saw the end of the time when public
forests were not needed to supply the nation's demand for lumber. 50
Government planners renewed land acquisition activities51 and developed
much of the infrastructure on which further use was predicated.52 There
was a renewed emphasis on the utilization of forest lands for resource
values. The perception of the forests' use as being primarily timber
oriented, based on "economic" principles, was further entrenched by
passage of the Sustained Yield Act of 1944.53
The increased call to harvest National Forests awakened the conser-
vation movement, and in the 1950's Congress was inundated with propos-
als advocating a multiple-use concept 54 for those areas. In 1960, the
Multiple Use-Sustained Yield Act 55 (MU-SY) was passed, which, for the
first time, explicitly required the Forest Service to consider recreation and
wildlife values (as well as watershed protection) as resources in the
management of the National Forests.5
Since MU-SY there have been two significant Acts aside from NEPA
affecting Forest Service planning: RPA and NFMA. Both evidence the
strong trend in the United States during the last two decades towards more
centrally controlled, long range planning for public resources. 57 NFMA, in
49. Control of the forest reservations finally, after much political infighting, rested with the
Forest Service under Pinchot's management, in 1905. ROBINSON, supra note 44, at 14. It was during
this time that the Forest Service established its well earned "Tradition of Excellence" in the
conservation of the nation's forests. Address by Charles Wilkinson, The Forest Service: A Call for a
Return to First Principles, Public Land Law Conference, Missoula, Montana (Apr. 22, 1983).
50. This was a function of both the depletion of private lands and the growing appetite of the
nation for forest products. ROBINSON, supra note 44, at 14.
51. President Roosevelt was encouraged to follow this policy by Pinchot, now serving in an
advisory role, who felt "the solution of the private problem lies chiefly in large scale public acquisiton of
forest lands." Huffman, supra note 44, at 273.
52. The Civilian Conservation Corps of the New Deal targeted much of its activities on various
construction projects aimed at "improving the public forests." Barlow, Evolution of the National
Forest Management Act of 1976, 8 ENVTL. L. 539 (1977).
53. The Act of MARCH 29, 1944, Chap. 146, 58 Stat. 132 (1944).
54. ROBINSON, supra note 44, at 14; Huffman, supra note 44, at 25.
55. See supra note 9.
56. In lobbying for the passage of MU-SY, then Forest Service Chief Richard McArdle called
on Congress to make it explicit that the (five) resource values (outdoor recreation, range, timber,
watershed, and fish and wildlife) were to be given equal consideration. Hearings before the
Subcommittee on Forests of the House Committee on Agriculture, National Forests-Multiple Use
and Sustained Yield, 86th Cong. 2d Sess, 39 (1960). Whatever his intention, it is apparent that Forest
Service policy did not undergo a like change. BARNEY, supra note 44, at 112. The passage of the
Wilderness Act (Act of Sept. 3, 1964, Pub.L.No. 88-577,78 Stat. 890) four years later evidenced the
growing concern for the provision of recreational opportunities. Some viewed the passage of the Act as
.expressing a lack of faith in the ability of the Forest Service to implement the multiple use
requirement." Huffman, supra note 44, at 245.
57. Hannah, Cortner, & Schweitzer, Institutional Limits to National Public Planning for
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addition to implementing the inventories and assessments of RPA, was
passed as a response to the Forest Service practice of clearcutting, which
had become increasingly unpopular in many circles,58 and the decision in
West Virginia Division of Izaak Walton League of America, Inc. v. Butz
(the Monongahela decision), which threatened Forest Service logging
activities.59 In the eyes of many, these Acts were a "firm step in the
direction of Congress mandating management procedures,. . .[and] were
necessary because professional foresters had not been able to resist
industry pressures to cut timber [in any fashion other than
clearcutting] ."o
NFMA was passed as a compromise between industry and the
conservation community. 61 It allows regulated clearcutting, and explicitly
makes NEPA applicable to Forest Service plans. Besides repealing the
Organic Act provision relied upon in the Monongahela decision,62 the Act
addresses several policy matters.6" It reemphasizes the policy of multiple
use-sustained yield, provides detailed standards for timber harvesting and
planning for individual forests, and also mandates increased public
participation.
The Act has a comprehensive scheme for the provision of public
participation in the planning process, providing that in certain instances,
specific actions cannot be taken without the opportunity for initial public
comment.6 4 The general congressional intent was that the planning process
Forest Resources: The Resources Planning Act, 21 NAT.REs.J. 203 (1981).
58. D. BURK, THE CLEARCUT CRISIS (1970).
59. West Virginia Division of Izaak Walton League of America, Inc. v. Butz, 552 F.2d 945 (4th
Cir. 1975). The court interpreted a provision of the Organic Act limiting timber harvesting on federal
lands to those trees which were of "mature or large growth" as precluding clearcutting as a valid
management practice. The decision had the effect of threatening virtually all of the Forest Service's
clearcutting programs nationwide. Congress acted quickly to pass NFMA, which repealed the part of
the Organic Act relied upon in the Monongahela decision, and re-established clearcutting as a valid
management policy-albeit with restrictions not previously codified.
60. Barlow, Evolution of the National Forest Management Act, 8 ENVTL.L. 539, 544 (1977).
See generally, BARNEY, supra note 44.
61. Note, The Forest Service. NEPA, and Clearcutting, 19 NAT.REs.J. 423 (1979).
62. See supra, note 59.
63. For a more complete discussion of the full range of issues dealt with in NFMA, see Mulhern,
The National Forest Management Act of)1976: A Critical Examination, 7 B.C. ENV. AFF. L. REV. 99
(1978); Hall & Wasserstrom, The National Forest Management Act of 1976: Out of the Courts and
Back to the Forests, 8 ENVTL. L. 523 (1977); Stoel, The National Forest Management Act, 8 ENVTL.
L. 547 (1977).
64. See supra note 27;see also Stoel,supra note 63 at 566. In addition, Sec. 6(f) (1) of the Act, 16
U.S.C. § 1604(f)(1) (1976) requires that plans developed "shall: (1) Form one integrated plan for each
unit of the National Forest System, incorporating in one document or one set of documents, available to
the public at convenient locations, all of the features required by this section." Sec. 6(g)(1) of the Act,
16 U.S.C. 1604(g)(1) specifies that the regulations promulgated under NFMA "shall include, but not
be limited to: (1) Specifying procedures to insure that land management plans are prepared in
accordance with the National Environmental Policy Act. .."
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"be accomplished with improved opportunity for public participation at all
levels."'6 5 Perhaps most telling is that every proposed provision concerning
public participation was adopted in the final version of the Act.6"
This emphasis on the participatory process represented a fundamen-
tal change in Forest Service policy. Previously, all "participation" activi-
ties were via carefully selected "key person" contacts, "advisory commit-
tees," "information outreach" such as public seminars, and the like. 17
Never before had the Forest Service been required to open up the
decisionmaking process to the general public, and then consider and react
to that input.
The controversy leading to NFMA demonstrated a public concern
with forest policy, 68 and to a lesser degree, a public statement that the
Forest Service has been unable to manage for values other than timber and
commercial resources.6 9 Historically, the perception was that the Forest
Service existed to protect lands from private industry (and that indeed was
an accurate perception in the early days). Increasingly, however, the
feeling has become that, in addition to industry, the forests must be
protected from the Forest Service itself. Thus, the emphasis on public
participation as a vehicle for the achievement of this end is understandable
and desirable.
B. Forest Management, Economics, and the Traditional
Conception.
There has been a considerable amount of attention over the last
decade directed at analyzing the criterion for managing public lands. Some
of this discussion has indicated that these resources can be managed more
effectively by limiting their allocation more directly to mechanisms which
distribute private resources among competing ends-specifically market
prices. While this may be appropriate for some resources, there are other
resources for which no clear market price exists, and thus an attempt will
65. S. REP. No. 588, 94th CONG., 2D SEss. 34 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 6693.
66. Mulhern, supra note 63, at 122.
67. ROBINSON, supra note 44, at 46.
68. Mulhern, supra note 63, at 123, see also notes 58, 59 and accompanying text.
69. Whatever may have been the trend post-NFMA during the *Carter Administration,
Assistant Secretary of Agriculture John Crowell has reminded us that the same may still be the case
today; and indeed, even emphasized by the current administration. He states:
Our emphasis will be on productivity and economic efficiency in all programs. Our
approach can be characterized as emphasizing conservation rather than preservation-wise
use rather than non-use. There will also be more emphasis on commodity programs that
make direct economic contributions and generate receipts. Amenity programs will not get
the same emphasis as in the last Administration, but they will not be ignored either.
See supra note 19.
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have to be made to determine their value to society to insure the
incorporation of these resource values in management decisions. An
allocation process which is (at least partially) reliant upon economic
criterion would also necessitate in some instances a redirection of public
policy.
Traditionally, some public resources have been allocated with little
regard for their prices in private markets. The reasons for non-price
allocation are numerous, and the results can be costly. The importance of a
resource's price is that it tends to reflect its relative scarcity. If a resource is
offered for consumption at a price below its equilibrium market price, (i.e.,
the price at which the quantity supplied equals the quantity demanded),
then that resource will tend to be overemployed. This can eventually lead to
a shortage of the resource.70 If the resource is available only at the market
determined price, less of the resource will be demanded and a shortage
avoided. 1
One reason that public resources may be consumed at other than
optimal levels is that consumers do not realize the true opportunity costs7 2
associated with the employment of the particular resource. The final
consumer does not face the true social cost of using the resource for his/her
private gain. This tends to be more prevalent in the allocation of public
resources, in contrast to private resources, because government acts as a
buffer between the cost to the consumer and the cost to society of resource
employment.73 By using tax revenues to subsidize, at least in part, the cost
of resource employment, the consumer is allowed to use a resource at a
price which does not accurately reflect its opportunity cost.
An historic example of this sort of resource allocation is evident in the
use of water in the west. In the late 1800's, there was no shortage of water in
an absolute sense. (There were, of course, regional shortages, but these
were in areas which have always been short of water, and were due more to
70. The problem may be more accurately defined in terms of the supply schedule, rather than
market prices. In private markets, the quantity supplied is generally set so as to maximize profit. In
public markets, however, the quantity supplied may not be set by a market generated criterion. The
result is that the quantity supplied and the resource price do not correspond to the optimal market
clearing (or equilibrium) solution.
71. This implicitly assumes that the resource is a good which exhibits some elasticity of demand.
An increase in price would then result in a decrease in the quantity demanded.
72. Opportunity Cost-the reflection of all other consumption possibilities which are foregone.
One opportunity cost associated with logging operations is the positive value associated with wilderness
(or at least undeveloped) lands.
73. Such subsidies may be direct or indirect. With logging, for example, they may include
government financed road construction or insulation from competitive bidding processes in acquiring
stumpage; or they may be of a more indirect nature, such as the failure to account for the cost of lost
aesthetic values, watershed, fish, wildlife, etc. We recognize, however, that these indirect costs may also
be ignored on private forest land.
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the mechanical problems associated with transporting the water, rather.
than there being no water to transport.) As the west became more
populated, the federal government began subsidizing water projects to
facilitate irrigation for farming. 4 As the demand for the essentially free
resource has increased, water has become more scarce. The cost to
consumers, however, has not reflected the increasing scarcity of the
resource. The result, according to Cuzan, is that "demand for water is
outstripping its supply at existing prices, particularly in western states. '7 5
The suggestion is that, had the consumers' cost of water utilization
reflected its scarcity, supply and demand might be nearer an equilibrium.
Public forest land is another resource (or conglomerate of several
resources) which has historically been managed in an economic void. There
has been little economic consideration given to managing these lands for
resources other than timber. There has, however, been some recent
discussion directed at intensifying economic consideration in national
forest management. Although market prices should be a consideration in
the allocation of public resources, a comprehensive economic approach
would imply more than a consideration of tangible market prices. The
ultimate question is whether the price system is capable of facilitating
forest resource management in such a way as to realize the "public
interest".
As alluded to earlier, the market price of resources will enlighten the
consuming public as to the scarcity of a resource, and in this vein should
have a strong influence on Forest Service management decisions. There are
other resources, however, whose scarcity may not be accurately reflected
by market conditions. Generally, no- clear market prices exist for these
resources; examples might be wildlife habitat, aesthetic values, wilderness,
and various existence values. An attempt may be made, however, to value
such resources through the use of "shadow pricing". Traditional cost/
benefit calculations can then be derived for alternate management
schemes.
According to Sassone and Schaffer:
A shadow price may be defined as a value associated with a
unit of some good which indicates how much some specified index
of performance can be increased (or decreased) by the use (or
loss) of the marginal unit of that commodity. . .[S] hadow prices
are the social values of goods created, used up, or otherwise
affected by a project. 6
74. See F. Merk, HISTORY OF THE WESTWARD MOVEMENT (1978).
75. Cuzan, A Critique of Collectivist Water Resources Planning, in PROPERTY RIGHTS AND
NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 53 (R. Stroup ed. 1979).
76. Sassone and Schffer, COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS: A HANDBOOK 50 (1977).
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The authors go on to state that "the most dire need for shadow pricing
occurs when the goods or services to be valued are not exchanged on a
market." 7 While there are several ways in which to apply shadow prices,
the authors point out that ". . .there is no comprehensive and foolproof set
of procedures for shadow pricing. Unfortunately, subjective judgment
often weighs heavily in shadow pricing exercises."78
Thus, the allocation of certain resources such as timber may be
managed very effectively through the use of market price signals, while
other resources (intangibles) will have to be valued outside of the market
context.79 The national forester is faced with the responsibility of manag-
ing the forest resources as directed by the various statutes, and further to
strike a balance between managing for resources with tangible prices and
managing for those resources that do not exhibit clear market prices.
What is implied in the re-kindled emphasis in utilizing economic
criteria in timber land management? Is there a tendency to maintain
traditional forest management practices which emphasize a dominant
resource? Obviously, timber is the forest resource most susceptible to
market pricing, and it is conceivable that there may be a propensity to
continue management practices dominated by this single resource. Since
this seems to be the historical precedent, a stronger emphasis on "economic
criteria" (i.e., emphasizing timber and commodity values) will have little
substantive role in redirecting Forest Service policy.80 To apply economic
criteria to forest land management in a comprehensive manner would
necessitate the valuation of all forest resources, and a comparison of
relative benefits to society derived from alternative management practices.
This, however, would violate the Forest Service's traditional definition of
sustained yield forestry.
To understand this management concept, it is instructive to explore
the definition(s) of sustained yield, and the Congressional mandate set
77. Id. at 85.
78. Id. at 51.
79. Actually, timber may be valued by markets, but its optional allocation will be somewhat
dependent on the values of other forest land uses not recognized in the market.
80. That this practice still characterizes Forest Service policy, despite statutory and regulatory
guidance to the contrary, was made evident in the RARE II program, where the cuort, in California v.
Bergland, 483 F. Supp. 465, 484 (E.D.Cal. 1980), found that the Forest Service valued,
"[b]y contrast, (to the articulated weighting of wilderness resources/values) a comparative
wealth of information is provided concerning development potential and resource output.
Each area is given a rating for development potential. . .yield estimates are given for
timber, mineral, gas, oil, uranium, coal, geothermal potential, grazing, and recreational use.
[The] statement doesn't consider. . .presently existing wilderness characteris-
tics. . .unique characteristics. . .specifie values. [I]t never examines the economic and
beneficial environmental values of wilderness."
See also, supra note 69.
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forth in the Multiple Use-Sustained Yield Act of 1960.
According to H.H. Chapman, a widely accepted definition of sus-
tained yield in the early 1900's was "the removal from the forest by
cuttings, of the volume in each year just equal to the net increment of the
forest for that year."8" This statement implies that the concept of sustained
yield deals with the management of only the timber resource. This single
resource connotation is echoed by R.W. Behan as he quotes from Bernard
Fernow's book: "[T] he ideal of a forester. . .[is a] forest so arranged that
annually, forever, the same amount of wood product, namely, that which
grows annually. . .may be harvested."8 "
With the maturing of the forest profession the definition of sustained
yield has varied, but it has always been an important part of Forest Service
timber policy." As previously illustrated, the initial concept was one which
attempted to equate (restrict) timber harvest to timber growth (per some
time period). This ideal was re-evaluated in the 1920's when it became
evident that many forests were comprised of old growth timber, and
exhibited little additional growth.84 The result was a redirection of timber
management practices in favor of intense harvest to perpetuate an
acceptable forest profile; one in which traditional sustained yield policies
could be practiced.
In the 1930's there emerged a concern for stabilizing communities,
and policy shifted towards uniform harvest regardless of forest profile.85 In
1944, the Sustained Yield Forest Management Act was adopted.86 A
major impetus of this legislation "was to promote the stability of forest-
dependent communities by establishing cooperative sustained yield units
in which private and federal land would be managed jointly", but still
primarily for timber.87
The effect of this legislation was to allow private firms to purchase
public timber at a price not less than the appraised value, but insulated
from any competitive bidding process. This generated an expanded and
guaranteed supply of timber for private firms without the firms facing the
carrying costs associated with the supply. The result was the allowance for
monopoly power over public stumpage by certain private firms. This was
81. H. CHAPMAN, FOREST MANAGEMENT (1931).
82. B. FERNOW, ECONOMICS OF FORESTRY 200 (1902), cited in Behan, Political Popularity and
Conceptual Nonsense: The Strange Case of Sustained Yield Forestry, 8 ENVTL. L. 320 (1977).
83. Parry, Vaux, Dennis, The Evolution of U.S. Forest Service Sustained Yield Policy
(Research Paper I, Forest Policy Series, 1982).
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. The Sustained Yield Forest Management Act of 1944, Pub.L.No. 78-273, 585 Stat. 132
(1944).
87. See supra note 8.
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based on the conclusion that community stability could be assured simply
by regulating timber harvests.88
In 1960, Congress attempted to redefine Forest Service policy with the
passage of the Multiple Use-Sustained Yield Act. This Act directed the
Forest Service to manage public timber lands on a sustained yield basis,
where sustained yield was defined as "the achievement and maintenance in
perpetuity of a high level of annual or periodic output of the various
renewable resources of the national forests without impairment of the
productivity of the land".89 Congress further realized that management
practices which were predominately single resource intensive did not
comprise a healthy national policy for both economic and biological
reasons. It attempted to initiate more comprehensive guidelines for
management decisions by mandating multiple-use management, where
multiple use was defined as:
The management of all of the various renewable surface
resources of the national forests so that they are utilized in the
combination that will best meet the needs of the American
people; making the most judicious use of the land for some or all
of these resources or related services over areas large enough to
provide sufficient latitude for periodic adjustments in use to
conform to changing needs and conditions; that some land will be
used for less than all of the resources, each with the other, without
impairment of the productivity of the land, with consideration
being given to the relative values of the various resources, and not
necessarily the combination of uses that will give the greatest
dollar return or the greatest unit output.90
While this Act encompassed the first legislative definition of sustained
yield, as well as the first official recognition of comprehensive forest
management encompassing something more than timber management, it
did little to alter the course of Forest Service management practices. 91
What did impress the Forest Service in the 1960's was the recognition
that the survivability of the western timber industry (which by then
included some older eastern timber interests) was highly dependent upon
public timber. The result was that the Forest Service accepted an even
larger responsibility for community stability, and formally adopted an
even flow timber policy in 1963.92 In 1973, with Emergency Directive No.
88. Id.
89. 16 U.S.C. § 531(b) (1976), see supra note 9.
90. Id.
91. See supra note 83.
92. Id.
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16, this was redefined as non-declining even flow.93 This policy became law
in 1976 with the passage of the NFMA. This short exploration indicates
that economic criteria, in terms of dealing with all forest resources, have
had a minimal impact on the management policies of the Forest Service.
In 1982, the Forest Service drafted a new "rule book". "Perhaps one
of the most significant changes [in the new book] is that the lumber market,
not biology, will now determine which lands are to be classified as
commercial timberland."9 4 The implication is that there will be a heavier
reliance placed on economic analysis in the forest planning process.
Although this is encouraging at first glance, a historical review of forest
land management suggests that what the Forest Service views as economic
criteria may not correlate with optimal resource allocation since some
resources don't exhibit explicit monetary values.
The Multiple Use-Sustained Yield Act of 1960 mandated manage-
ment policies with the intent of sustaining all resources, but Forest Service
practices have continued to be dominated by single resource manage-
ment.95 And, as indicated by Behan, the traditional concept of sustained
yield fails to "accomodate unplanned changes due to unpredicted mortal-
ity from fire, insects, or disease; changes in laws or policies; or effects of
unpredictable events". 96 This concept also perverts the decision to harvest
timber, both biologically and economically.
If there is going to be a reliance on economic criteria in the forest land
allocation process the Forest Service must alter its policy of dominant
resource management-an event having no historical precedent. And it
would have to eliminate subsidies to timber firms (such as road construc-
tion and non-competitive timber sales) so that the "true" price of lumber
can be exposed. By subsidizing the timber producer, the Forest Service has
little notion as to what amount of timber would actually be demanded if
93. Id.
94. Woodruff, Forest Service Comes Up With New Rule Book, The Missoulian (Missoula,
Montana) Oct. 2, 1982, at 5, col. 1. The definition of Net Public Benefits in the new regulations, 36
C.F.R. § 219.3, 47 Fed. Reg. 43039 (1982) is:
An expression used to signify the overall long term value to the nation of all outputs and
positive effects (benefits) less all associated inputs and negative effects (costs) whether they
can be quantitatively valued or not. Net public benefits are measured by both quantitative
and qualitative criteria rather than a single measure or index. The maximization of net
public benefits to be derived from management of units of the National Forest System is
consistent with the principles of multiple use and sustained yield.
Although this definition seemingly opens up the inquiry to many intangible values, the results of past
(and many current) forest resource allocations show that the values attached to some intangibles are, in
contrast to tangible resource values, de minimus. This shadow pricing is of necessity subjective, and in
that respect the importance of public input is the effect it should have on the decisionmaker's valuation
calculus.
95. See supra note 83.
96. Behan, supra note 82.
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firms and consumers faced the entire social cost of its harvest (i.e., the
equilibrium supply).
Furthermore, in the interest of economics, the Forest Service would
have to realize that, even in situations where timber production may
generate a positive benefit/cost calculation, there may be some other
resource which provides an even greater net benefit (such as wilderness),
and as such that is the resource for which the forest should be managed. In
short, applying economic criteria to resource management is not synony-
mous with intensely managing only those resources with clear market
prices or those resources which provide a monetary return.
The history of Forest Service management practices seems to indicate
that accountability for allocation decisions is not precipitated by regula-
tion and/or a strict definition of terms, but conversely is afforded through
the exposure of the manager to incentives which will tend to influence
rational decisions that promote a reflection of market conditions and public
utility.
How can this sort of accountability be achieved? One place to start is
by increasing the potential for accountability through public participation.
This is a meaningful way to establish social values (shadow prices) which
may not be represented well in the market, and then to set a precedent for
incorporating these values with the market prices of other resources in
determining the costs and benefits to society of alternative management
schemes.
C. Agency Decisionmaking and Public Participation: Policies and
Problems.
Why all this fuss over public involvement? According to Ostheimer:
Administrative agencies have been given responsibilities
that make them anachronistic aspects of a democratic society.
Congress has empowered administrative agencies to, 1) collect
needed data, thus circumventing the input system of elected
party leaders and platforms, 2) make decisions, thus circum-
venting the representative-legislative process, and 3) carry out
enforcement. The public agencies have thus been making deci-
sions in a temporary political vacuum. Thus, in a sense, the
present day participatory emphasis represents a restoration of
the political balance in our democracy-a balance that was
temporarily lost because the complexity of problems developed
faster than the institutional capacity to deal with them through
representative procedure.9
97. Ostheimer, supra note 43, at 14.
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The challenge, then, of public participation in the land management-
planning process is to balance traditional democratic notions of citizen
involvement in government with the countervailing need for technical
competency and efficiency of the technocratic society.98
Participation in the decisionmaking process must be seen in light of
the system within which it is to operate; the public bureaucracy. Generally,
the bureaucracy is influenced by: 1) formal rules, laws and regulations, and
2) internal goals and informal rules designed toward institutional sur-
vival.99 The first and fundamental source of bureaucratic survival is an
agency's ability to attract and maintain a constituency (i.e., outside
political support). The main constituency of the Forest Service since the
time the National Forests were looked to as primary sources of the timber
supply has been, not surprisingly, the timber industry, and construction
and road building interests (and also, to a lesser extent, county govern-
ments in National Forest areas, who receive 25 percent of the timber sales
receipts from sales on land within the county). 100 Traditionally, this
constituency has had a greater interest in a dominant resource policy
(primarily timber and mining) for the National Forests than any other
orientation.
Like most agencies, the Forest Service has long regarded itself as the
expert and guardian of the public interest within its realm.10' Most public
foresters share the same formal education, analytical techniques and
paradigms, common information, and membership in professional socie-
ties. These common perspectives contribute to building a rather insular
bureaucracy, limiting the agencies' flexibility to respond and innovate. 0 2
The Forest Service has traditionally engaged in informal contact with the
public through vehicles such as advisory councils, ad hoc committees,
community information programs, and the like. 0 ,3 Despite this, conserva-
tion groups have pressed for, and received more direct and formal avenues
of input.10 4 The foresters' initial reaction to this participatory emphasis
was understandable. The perception that old methods were adequate,
combined with the fierce insularity of the agency and the general weight of
input as threatening the traditional dominant use policy (and thus posing
risky political constituency choices), resulted in a feeling by many in the
98. Achterman and Fairfax, The Public Participation Requirements of the Federal Land
Policy and Management Act, 21 ARiz.L.Rv. 501 (1979).
99. Hannah, et al., supra note 57, at 210.
100. BARNEY, supra note 44, at 137; Conversation with Dr. Richard Shannan, Professor of
Forestry, University of Montana School of Forestry, Missoula, Montana (Feb. 27, 1983).
101. ROBINSON, supra note 44, at 273.
102. Hannah, et al., supra note 57, at 216.
103. ROBINsoN, supra note 44, at 4G 470.
104. ROBINSON, supra note 44, at 273.
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agency that public participation was (is) counterproductive, 10 5 and a
reaction that has been labelled "defensive". 6
The demand for increased public participation in governmental
decisionmaking began in the 1960's with those advocating the cause of the
blacks, the poor, and others traditionally outside the political main-
stream. 107 Similarly, environmentalists saw environmental problems "in
terms of values and interests. . . excluded from decisionmaking".1oa Thus
the environmental movement has primarily adhered to procedural goals
aimed at opening up the process.109 With the judicial orientation of the
early environmental movement, this was generally the most effacious
manner of action.110 Other goals identified along the way in the push for
greater participation have been those of "controlling government, assuring
sound and wise decisions, providing for due process, protecting minority
views, establishing responsibility and responsiveness, seeking equity, and
striving for the public interest."'1
Thus it is imperative that a clear and cogent theory of the role that
participation activities are to play in the decisionmaking process be
articulated, so that both the Forest Service and the public are not at
constant loggerheads over this issue. The general criticism of the Forest
Service's implementation of the participation mandate is that it has
concerned itself more with the how (procedure) than to the why (the
substance) it involves the public.112 This is due in large part to vague
statutes, 113 but also to professional disagreement on that point. The model
offered by proponents of increased participation1"4 is premised on the
105. Ostheimer, supra note 43, at 14.
106. Id. Robinson attributes this fact to: 1) greater public awareness in the environment, and 2)
the general trend of increased public participation in administrative processes. The early participation
mandate was that of NEPA, but not until NFMA was that approach explicitly, statutorily recognized
in the Forest Service's organic legislation.
107. Wengert, Citizen Participation: Practice in Search of a Theory, 16 NAT.REs.J.23 (1976).
108. Achterman, supra note 98, at 506. Although the environmental movement, its members
being predominantly middle and upper class, may not fit terribly well under the rubric of "outsiders,"
many of the substantive points they push inarguably have been.
109. Id.
110. Id. The authors state: "The courts have generally supported environmentalists' efforts by
allowing them to use procedural wedges to press their substantive goals." Dean Ely, in DEMOCRACY
AND DISTRUST, contends that the court's role in these matters is not to find and enforce substantive
"rights" of the parties (and it is very doubtful that there are any such clearly articulated rights in the
area of environmental and land-use policy), but rather to fulfill a "representation-reinforcing" function
to assure that all substantial values worthy of respect have been represented in the particular
governmental decision. J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 77-88 (1980).
I11. Wengert, supra note 10, at 39.
112. Id. See also ROBINSON, supra note 44, at 273.
113. The Barney report, supra note 44, speaking to this problem, suggested that Congress make
the role of participation more explicit in the statutory schemes.
114. This also seems to be in line with the model employed by the courts under NEPA, see infra
19831
70 PUBLIC LAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 4
necessity of providing the agency with an expanded set of ideas, rewards,
and incentives. The application of this model has two elements: first, to
delimit the information horizon of the agency, and second, to establish
accountability through provision of a new, broader, and enforceable set of
incentives by requiring an articulated consideration of values identified by
the public.
The first can be seen in the requirement that the Forest Service
provide a "broad range of reasonable alternatives" in the planning
process. 115 From the individual participant's standpoint, this most closely
approaches the traditional democratic notion that knowledge is a principle
tool in change and effective political action.116 In addition to providing the
citizen with adequate information on which to base comments, it also
forces the Forest Service to explore a greater range of possibilities, thus
addressing the argument that "government agencies rarely respond to
interests not represented in their proceedings.117
This limited "information exchange"" perception of the participa-
tion process is the one generally accepted and considered top priority by the
Forest Service. It is also the one most acceptable to a group of professionals
such as those comprising the agency. It tells them simply to work a bit
harder at uncovering and valuing various potential resource allocations
and not instructing them as to what the decision should be. The deci-
sionmaker, exercising his or her professional expertise, would then decide
on the "optimal" allocation." 9
The second element of this model of participation recognizes the need
to provide for a system of accountability to the public's desires in the
allocation of various resource uses, and is aimed at the validity of the
notes 167, 168, 171, 178 and accompanying text. The authors, not surprisingly, also agree with a strong
participatory model.
115. Supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text.
116. Frauenglass, Environmental Policy: Public Participation and the Open Information
System, I1 NAT.REs.J. 489 (1971).
117. Crampton, The Why, Where, and How of Broadened Public Participation in the
Administrative Process, 60 GEo.L.J. 525 (1972).
118. Supra notes 37, 38, and accompanying text.
119. In addressing the professional role in such decisions, former Dean of the University of
Montana School of Forestry, Arnold Bolle, challenged the professionals' capacity for making decisions
in the "public interest."
In my opinion, the professional in any field--education, health, defense or forestry and
natural resources-has an important but specific role to play. He carries out the demands of
society in his area of expertise, he lets the public know the opportunities and possibilities
available for choice in policies and he can inform and warn the public of the consequences of
the choices it may make. But he is no better qualified than the general public in deciding
what is good for the public and what it ought to do (within stated limits) with forests and
related resources.. . In making such decisions the public should and needs to be involved.
Hearings before the Subcommittee on Forests of the House Committee on Agriculture, Establish a
Commission to Investigate Clearcutting on Public Lands, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 92 (1971).
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decision itself.120 In the Barney Report 121 this accountability function was
emphasized. The author asserted that in order to assure that forest
management plans adequately reflected public opinion, Congress would
have to provide for procedures of substantive public involvement in the
planning process.122 Six of the twenty-eight proposals for reform of the
Forest Service specifically dealt with the need to allow access to the
decisionmakers, and to insure their accountability.'23
Perhaps the most important suggestion for establishing this accounta-
bility was that citizen proposals were not to be just heard, but actually
considered. 24 This "consideration" proposal was not well received by the
Forest Service. It was perceived as threatening professional values (by
denying their expertise), causing political controversy (by challenging the
agency's traditional "apolitical role"), and, most importantly, establishing
new criteria and pressures with which the managers were
uncomfortable. 2 5
A third perception of the participation process was identified by
several commentators within the forestry profession itself. They pushed
the idea that the process could be used in a functional manner to increase
the constituency and credibility of the agency. 126 It was warned that
"[f] ailure to solicit public participation agressively and innovatively-and
respond to it-can result in the loss of agency stature.' 1 27 Some even
suggested appealing to emerging constituency groups; "environmentalists
are in the task environment of a timberland management agency because
they can influence laws which define the service of the agency, budgets and
appropriation, (and) the amount of land under their jurisdiction."'1 28
Forest, Service professionals, though, have not fully accepted this con-
120. ROBINSON, supra note 44, states that this function "might be called the social or political
function, that of permitting the public some measure of influence over decisions affecting their interests
(at 273).
121. BARNEY, supra note 44.
122. Id. at 131.
123. Id. at 157.
124. Id. at 131. Achterman, supra note 97, at 530, also suggests that "[t]he courts should focus
on whether the (agency) actually considered all of the viable alternatives presented and whether the
views of those affected were presented."
125. Achterman, supra note 98, at 506.
126. Hendee, Clark, and Stankey, A Framework for Agency Use of Public Input in Resource
Decisionmaking, JOURNAL OF SOIL AND WATER CONSERVATION, (Mar.-Apr. 1974); Address by R.
Kizer to North Idaho Chamber of Commerce, Bonners Ferry, Idaho, Oct. 22, 1971, Public
Participation in the Management of National Forests; Address by S. Uurich to Foresters Day
Convocation, Colorado State University, Fort Collins, Colorado, Feb. 23, 1973, Public Involvement
Today.
127. Hendee, Clark & Stankey, supra note 126, at 66.
128. Ostheimer, supra note 43, at 15, citing Gale.
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cept, 12 9 and because of that, some have recommended "attitudinal
changes" within the agency.""0
The participatory decisionmaking process has, in several respects, not
lived up to expectations. Some of the assumptions of the efficacy of public
input have proven problematic in application. The first assumption was
that public participation would reveal a full range of alternatives, and thus
lead to better and easier decisions. The second was that decisions made
with appropriate public involvement would be accepted by those involved,
and thus reduce controversy.131 Neither of these have proven to be
necessarily true. With more options available, choosing only one actually
becomes more difficult, and fostering active involvement can actually
heighten controversy and create polarization.132 Even from a pure "infor-
mation exchange" perspective, the volume of comment received may
render the process unproductive, or at least highly time consuming.133
Additionally, several factors coincide to restrict severely the agency's
ability to be completely responsive to the weight of public sentiment. There
may be insufficient physical resources to enact the desired alternative. A
lack of comprehensive and adequate knowledge by any party to the process,
including the agency (all the more likelihood when it is realized forest
planning generally deals with large and diverse ecosystems), and the lack
of specific statutory priorities, all work to constrain the agency's flex-
ibility.1 34 Many of the issues raised in the comment process are reflections
of broader controversies that exist apart from the specific planning setting;
it cannot be (and indeed, should not be) expected that public agencies
function as dispute resolution mechanisms.1 3 5 And the political reality of
the bureaucracy in a democratic system, continually working to limit
decision horizons,136 combined with the other constraints, all confine the
129. Id. at 15.
130. Karr, A Validity Model for Public Involvement (June 17, 1975) (unpublished masters
thesis, University of Montana).
131. Achterman, supra note 98, at 507, 508; citing Wengert, Citizen Participation: Practice in
Search of a Theory, 16 NAT.RFs.J. 23 (1976).
132. Achterman, supra note 98, at 508; see also Twight, Confidence or More Controversy:
Wither Public Involvement? JOURNAL OF FORESTRY, February 1977, at 93 (attempts to insure
representative involvement may and generally do attract alienated persons who participate only to
express resentment and generalized distrust of public officials); and Twight and Paterson, Conflict and
Public Involvement: Measuring Consensus, JOURNAL OF FORESTRY, Dec. 1979, at 771 (in three cases
after Forest Service public involvement processes had been completed, many participants still had
stereotyped misconceptions of the agency's position on land use areas. Perceived disagreement was
twice as great as actual disagreement. Membership in a conservation group was a primary variable
associated with a continued perception of polarization.)
133. ROBINSON, supra note 44, at 274.
134. Achterman, supra note 97, at
135. Id. at 532.
136. Hannah, et al., supra note 57, at 212, identifies several of the most salient effects of this
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potential for truly responsive decisionmaking.
Other problems identified have revolved around the participants
themselves. Public interest and environmental groups have been targets of
sharp attacks. The question is whether these groups really speak for "the
public interest".13 7 Tactics utilized by many of these groups have been
identified as leading to overlapping representation, questions of legitimacy
of representation, proliferation of issues, and polarization of parties.13 8
These are all valid questions, but they simply point to the reality of our
pluralist democratic society. Because of the increasing complexity of all
institutions, not everything works as efficiently as it could. But there has
been a deliberate choice to sacrifice some of the expedient values to protect
others deemed more fundamental. The impetus for involvement in these
technocratic state decisions at least shows a desire to provide a formal sense
of justice in according equal respect to all competing values.
It may be impossible to provide substantive equality for all interests
competing for the scarce resources of forest land, but, as Karr observed 3 9
"it [is] apparent that when the public involvement process is validated, the
decision process is, to some extent, also being subject to validation". The
ultimate inquiry is to the bottom line benefit of providing citizens with the
choice to participate, and do so effectively. As Wengert points out:
.. .the important fact [of the concept of the public interest is
that it is] the search for the public interest, the requirement to
rationalize decisions as being in the public interest that [is] the
significant aspect of the concept. . .it is the seeking that makes
the difference, even though we often fall short." 140
This search would be a hollow one if a strong, effective model of
participation was not available to make the decisionmakers accountable
and responsive to the values expressed. Such a model is evident in the
reality: 1) as a competitor with other agencies for scarce budget dollars, an agency will not want to
propose a solution potentially benefiting another agency, thus traditional solutions will remain favored;
2) in particular, a "no action," or status quo alternative could mean foregoing funding, and thus will
rarely be fully considered; 3) the political process encourages decisionmakers to focus on short-term
problems and solutions. To be politically feasible, future benefits must be heavily discounted compared
to current benefits. (This is obviously contrary to the long-term perspective needed to manage national
forests, ed.)
137. This is, of course, sidestepping for the moment the question of what actually is "the public
interest." See notes 159, 140 and accompanying text for some discussion of this issue.
138. ROBINSON, supra note 44, at 275, in an argument analogized environmental groups to
private industry (i.e., providing a service-represention-advocating clean air, water, recreational
opportunities, etc.) and asked that if those groups are merely selling a product, doesn't the existence of a
market for timber to build houses and provide jobs likewise evidence a constituency for that resource
use?
139. Karr, supra note 130, at 37.
140. Wengert, Citizen Participation in Search of a Theory, 16 NAT.REs.J. 23, 39 (1976).
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growing body of NEPA case law. Additionally, the acceptance of such was
strongly implicit in the NFMA debates with the inclusion of NEPA, the
acceptance of all proposed participation mandating clauses, and in express
provisions for participation in some of the management acts that were
politically the most controversial and environmentally damaging.14'
III. THE NEPA MODEL
The background of all federal agency action is the framework
provided by administrative law.142 The general administrative law theories
of government action and judicial review are the foundation upon which
NFMA-NEPA public participation activities rest. Traditionally, adminis-
trative procedure has revolved around the dichotomy of informal rulemak-
ing and adjudication. In adjudicatory actions where an individual (or
small, definable group of individuals) asserts his or her substantive rights,
formal, adversarial procedures are employed (formal notice, hearing, right
to cross-examination, and appeal). 43 Informal rulemaking is conducted
when rules of general applicability are involved. The only requirement in
informal rulemaking is for general notice to be given, and opportunity to
comment.'4 The traditional emphasis has been on "accurate, impartial
and rational application of legislative directives.' 45
Land management planning under NFMA is not an activity encom-
passed within either of the traditional administrative procedure catego-
ries . 48 Those categories generally lack the procedural mechanisms to
ensure fair and efficient decisionmaking while at the same time broadening
public involvement.147 But, with the recent emphasis on direct public
involvement, courts and agencies have had to be flexible in applying
traditional paradigms to new realities. Much of the problem stems from a
Congressional failure to define the purpose, goals and parameters of these
activities, and to distinguish between traditional concepts of administra-
tive procedure.14" Based on these three values, a continium of administra-
tive decisionmaking"49 has been developed along which they are implicated
141. Supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text.
142. Most administrative procedure is governed by the Administrative Procedures Act, Title V,
U.S.C.
143. 5 U.S.C. § 554 (1976).
144. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1976). The opportunity to comment is generally limited to written
submissions, unless specific regulations or the agency provides otherwise.
145. Achterman, supra note 98, at 515.
146. See Forest Service Manual 1726.7-1, Interim Directive No. 7, August 7, 1980.
147. Achterman, supra note 98, at 515.
148. Id. at 517.
149. Verkuil, The Emerging Concept of Administrative Procedure, 78 COLuM.L.REv. 258
(1978). Professor Verkuil's norms of administrative procedure are grounded in traditions of due
process and other related concepts of fair procedure, and implicate the following values: 1) fairness: the
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to varying degrees, determining the procedures necessitated in each
case.
150
The planning process (along with policymaking) is the most highly
discretionary of agency actions, involving the interpretation and imple-
mentation of the agency's general statutory mandate. It has traditionally
been considered procedureless. Public participation in the planning pro-
cess is derivative of informal (notice and comment) rulemaking, where the
burden was on the public to become involved.1 51 Newer statutory authority
has shifted that burden to the agency so that it must now take affirmative
actions to involve the public.1 52 From the individual's standpoint, the
values of fairness and satisfaction are of relatively lesser import, although
the aggregate public interest in these values argues for a greater weight.153
The weight of the efficiency value in complex planning activities most
strongly suggests a wide range of procedural freedom. The balance
generally is toward more flexibility in procedure. This balance, coupled
with the disaggregate nature of the issues involved in "comprehensive
planning", make for a reality of extreme discretion vested in the deci-
sionmaker. Planning and policymaking have been likened most to legisla-
tion, but the problem with that paradigm is one of adequacy of
representation.1 54
Facing this balance, the United States Supreme Court has nonethe-
less articulated a check on this discretion. In Dunlop v. Bachowski,15 5 a
"reasons requirement" was posited. 56 Dunlop involved an appeal of the
Secretary of Labor's decision not to pursue a union complaint under a
statute that empowered him to investigate and act on such allegations. The
action of the Secretary under the statute was deemed to be of a
discretionary, policymaking nature (thus implicating the same values as
planning procedures). Although there is disagreement among commenta-
fundamental fairness and accuracy of the decision; 2) efficiency: the goal of low-cost resolution of
decisions and issues; and 3) satisfaction: the participant satisfaction necessary in a democratic society.
150. Id. at 294. Professor Verkuil's "Universe of Administrative Procedure" is broken into
functional categories reflecting different decisionmaking roles, their impact on individuals, and the
public at large. They are arranged in order of decreasing procedural necessity:
1) imposition of sanctions
2) ratemaking, licensing, and other regulatory decisions:
3) environmental and safety decisions:
4) awards of benefits, loans, grants, subsidies:
5) inspections, audits, approvals:
6) planning and policymaking
151. Achterman, supra note 98, at 512.
152. Supra notes 26, 27.
153. Verkuil, supra note 149, at 302.
154. Achterman, supra note 98, at 528.
155. Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560; see also Verkuil, supra note 148, at 302.
156. Verkuil, supra note 149, at 302, n. 229.
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tors as to the effectiveness of this requirement, 157 the policies the Court
articulated seem strong and flexible enough to apply to many different
situations, including planning actions. First, a statement of reasons
facilitates judicial review. "[W]hen action is taken by [the Secretary] it
must be such as to enable a reviewing court to determine with some
measure of confidence whether or not the discretion. . .has been exercised
in a manner that is neither arbitrary nor capricious. . .it is necessary for
[him] to delineate and make explicit the basis upon which discretionary
actions are taken.1 58 The Court also felt that Congress must have
intended for such "reasons" to be given to implement the Act, and finally,
that "a reasons requirement promotes thought by the Secretary and
compels him to cover the relevant points and eschew irrelevancies. 1 5 9
The requirements of Dunlop as they apply to the planning process
provide for the minimum procedure necessary of an agency involved in
planning, but the inquiry cannot end there. With the incorporation of
NEPA in the NFMA process, Congress identified a set of concerns that
accentuate the value of procedure.160 NEPA puts the emphasis on proper
procedure in this area of "environmental decisions"."16 The values identi-
fied from an administrative law perspective are difficult to balance because
all have substantial claims demanding recognition.6 ' The value of fairness
of the decision is crucial where the decisions made are often irreversible.
136
This is particularly a problem given the inability of modern science to fully
predict future effects, and of modern technology to mediate impacts. In the
management of public lands, the value of satisfaction is important because
programs can easily be frustrated due to a lack of public acceptance.
16 4
One need look no further than the flood of lawsuits challenging Forest
Service actions to realize this. Finally, efficiency in the decisionmaking
process is important because of the burden complicated and extended
administrative actions can have on the government and the economy.
16 5
Thus we have the "NEPA diagnosis", that the "problem of adminis-
trative procedure is to provide representation to all affected interests; the
problem of substantive policy is to reach equitable accommodations among
157. Id. at 229, 230.
158. 421 U.S. at 571.
159. Id. at 572.
160. For discussions of the background, purpose, and effect of NEPA on federal agencies, see
GRAD, TREATISE ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 19.01 (1980); RODGERS, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (1977);
YANNACONE & COHEN, ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS AND REMEDIES (1971). It is not the purpose of the
authors to explore the full range of NEPA's effect on administrative policy.
161. Supra note 150.
162. Verkuil, supra note 149, at 298.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
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those interests in varying circumstances; and the problem ofjudicial review
is to ensure that agencies provide fair procedures for representation and
reach fair accommodations. 166
NEPA's effect on administrative procedure, and in particular the
public participation requirement has, for the most part, been a product of
litigation and case law. The courts have generally taken the commenting
process very seriously.16 7 Although less explicit language in the Act refers
to public participation than to other inter-agency and inter-governmental
commenting, courts have nonetheless looked closely at this requirement in
assessing allegedly non-compliant agency actions. A relatively heavy
burden has been placed on agencies to demonstrate that public input has
been sought and considered. 68
NEPA, like NFMA, also requires that agencies explore a range of
alternatives.' 9 The question posed in interpreting this requirement has
been that of the sufficiency of the alternatives explored.17 0 Even the NEPA
regulations, in attempting to define this range as "reasonable", 71 or, as in
NFMA, a "broad range of reasonable alternatives",7' have left this
question unanswered. The general trend of case law accepted by the
Supreme Court states that the agency must provide sufficient information
for a "reasoned choice" by the decisionmaker.17 3
At this juncture perhaps it should be asked why the courts should
examine, and at times dismiss agency decisions. Certainly it is not because
courts have more expertise in the particular area; in fact, the extreme
opposite is the case. In the area of administrative procedure, courts
function as supplemental decisionmakers, providing a check of generality
that is necessary due to the specific role of the agency. This developed role is
due to the fact that:
The program-operating specialists become excessively wed-
ded to their programs, lose their sense of proportion, and resist
outside efforts to coordinate their activities. The cost of introduc-
ing expertise into politics and giving it relatively wide discretion
is a parochialism in which the more a political actor knows about
a given program the less capable he becomes of subordinating it
166. Stewart, The Reformation ofAmerican Administrative Law, 88 HARV.L.REV. 1665,1759
(1975).
167. GRAD, supra note 160, at 9.02(2)(c)(iii).
168. Id.
169. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(c)(iii) (1976).
170. GRAD, supra note 160, at 9.02(2)(c)(iv).
171. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14(a) (1982).
172. Supra note 24.
173. Minnesota Public Interest Research Group v. Butz, 541 F.2d at 1306 (8th Cir. 1976),
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
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to the general interest.
In this sense, the peculiar virtue of the judge is ignorance.
He knows relatively little about any of the public policy areas in
which he makes his decisions, and thus maintains a perspective
toward all. He is not so passionately involved in chicken raising or
locomotive inspection or tax collection that he allows any of these
government functions to grow out of proportion in his mind to the
other functions of government.'"
In general, requiring two or more decisions on the same problem is an
inefficient way of managing any enterprise, be it public or private;
particularly when the judicial decision is typically only a directive to the
agency to go back and make another decision, again subject to the same
type of review. With this in mind, the presumption generally has been
towards the validity of the agency determination. 75 But, given the premise
stated above, judicial correction of agency decisions is necessary when the
review will yield a better policy result than non-review, and this occurs
when it is evident that agency parochialism and over-ambition has so
colored the decision as to require correction.'7 6 NEPA's greatest contribu-
tion towards its ostensible purpose of environmental protection thus has
been in its provision of a legal framework within which such corrections can
be made.
NEPA posits a relatively new model for agency decisionmaking. The
old goal of accurate, impartial, and rational application of legislative
mandates is no longer sufficient. The pluralist model implicit within NEPA
seeks to insure that the decisionmaker affirmatively account for a wide
variety of interests affected by policy alternatives.? Perhaps most
illustrative of this point as it concerns public participation is the recent
174. SHARPIRO, THE SUPREME COURT AND ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES, at 52 (1968).
175. Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390 (1976). This deference to agency expertise has,
though, come under attack in NEPA review. See GRAD, supra note 159, at I 9.03(l)(b)(ii).
176. SHARPIRO, supra note 174, at 96. Again, Professor Ely's concept of the role courts are
particularly suited to play, that of insuring the "rules of the game" have been adhered to, and that one
actor has not exploited any comparative advantage it may possess vis-a-vis another actor, which a
particular law is designed to eliminate, is appropriate. See supra note 107. Professor Ronald Dworkin,
on the other hand, feels that the courts' proper role in such decisions is to search through the society's
institutional materials and background political morality to find a particular value that, if it is
sufficiently strong enough, would "trump" the exercise of an act based on contemporary utilitarian
justifications. As an example: if a particular resource allocation worked to severely disadvantage, say,
future generations, and the particular right of those generations affected is sufficiently strong enough to
hold sway against the contemporary benefits, then that act would be prohibited. See DWORKIN,
TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977). Whether the judge's role is merely to insure a sense of formal
procedural justice, or the seeking of substantive rights, is an issue that will not be resolved here. Also,
the spectre of judicial reversal of an agency's efforts provides a powerful internal incentive to make
those actions "bomb proof."
177. Stewart, supra note 166, at 1759. See also Calvert Cliffs Coordinating Committee, Inc. v.
AEC, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
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Ninth Circuit decision in California v. Block.178
A. California v. Block.
In Block, the court examined and invalidated Forest Service plans
promulgated under the Wilderness Act in what is commonly known as the
RARE II program. 17 9 In 1977, the Forest Service began to evaluate
programatically all of the roadless areas in the National Forest System for
potential classification as wilderness. 8 ' The draft EIS for RARE II was
issued June 15, 1978, and, following the commenting period, the final plan
came out on January 4, 1979, (the EIS and the plan are, for the purposes of
this case and discussion, one and the same). Shortly thereafter, the State of
California and several others1 81 filed an action in federal district court
alleging that the plans violated NEPA, MU-SY, and NFMA. The district
court, in California v. Bergland,82 held the RARE II final EIS deficient in
three respects: 1) there was insufficient site specific data to support non-
wilderness designations; 2) an adequate range of alternatives was not
considered, and; 3) the public was not given an adequate opportunity to
comment on the plan. It is the appellate court's analysis of the latter two
issues that is pertinent to the present inquiry.
The final EIS listed eleven alternatives, of which three ("all wilder-
ness", "no wilderness", and "no action") were included only as reference
points. The two faults in that allocation found by the court in Block were
first that the Forest Service did not include, as an alternative, increasing
resource production on forest lands already open to production in lieu of
asserting that such production was necessary in roadless areas. Secondly,
the alternatives were unreasonably skewed towards development. Of the
alternatives, none allocated more than 34 percent to wilderness, and none
less than 37 percent to development. (A third category, "Further Plan-
ning", which the court found as being tantamount to development,
178. California v. Block, 690 F.2d 753 (9th Cir. 1982).
179. The Wilderness Act of 1964, supra note 56, RARE II refers to the "Roadless Area Review
and Evaluation." The Forest Service had previously attempted to inventory and plan for all lands
potentially with the Act's definition in the RARE I program. The RARE I plan was enjoined until the
Forest Service completed an EIS on the plan. See Wyoming Outdoor Coordinating Council v. Butz,
484 F.2d 1244 (10th Cir. 1973).
180. Although the RARE II process and the Block decision involve a "programmatic" (i.e.,
system wide) plan, the requirements of NEPA apply with equal, if not greater, force to the specific,
allocational plans promulgated under NFMA. This is because it is even more evident that the NFMA
plans involve a "critical decision" vis-a-vis a particular area than did the RARE II plan. Seeinfra notes
196, 197 and accompanying text.
181. The Natural Resources Defense Council, Trinity County (Cal.), and the Clear Creek
Legal Defense Fund were allowed to intervene on California's side; and Webco Lumber Company, the
National Forest Products Association, and Del Norte, Shasta, and Siskiyou Counties (Cal.) were
allowed to intervene on behalf of the Forest Service.
182. California v. Bergland, 483 F. Supp. 465 (E.D. Cal. 1980).
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received a middle range of allocations.) Most significant was that no more
than 34 percent of the areas were deemed suitable for wilderness
classification when all of the areas under study fit at least the threshold
requirements of the Act. The Forest Service defended this allocation,
stating that the mix was a result of analysis under the "decisional
criteria",""- and that it was the criteria, and not the ultimate allocations,
that was pertinent under a NEPA review of alternatives. The court
disagreed, feeling that the values assigned the criteria were "instrumental
in skewing the alternatives", and that no adequate justification was given
for the differing valuation of the criteria. The focus necessary in the
"alternatives inquiry" was whether an EIS identification and discussion of
alternatives fosters informed public particiption and decisionmaking.
18 4
The range presented was too restricted to fully allow such an inquiry. The
prescription of NEPA, of fully opening up the decisionmaking process, was
not met because the rating system, as applied, "shrouded the issue from
public scrutiny behind the claim of administrative expertise."1 85
The import of this decision for planners is that the proper emphasis in
formulating a reasonable range of alternatives (and, under current NFMA
regulations, a "broad range") is not to be achieved by constructing an input
model that may be technically defensible; but that a model yielding a
demonstrably broad range of alternatives should be employed, and from
that broad range the effects of the differing alternatives explored.18 The
court looked to the results of the process, and not the process itself, in
determining this reasonableness.
The current Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) regulations
dealing with the implementation of NEPA18 7 reflect thejudicial "working-
out" of the Act. The provision of alternatives is considered the "heart of the
environmental impact statement." Alternatives should be presented in a
comparative form so they provide a "clear basis for choice. . .by the
decisionmaker and the public."18 8 This interpretation is in consonance with
the manner in which this requirement was applied by the court in Block.
The chief complaint was that the alternatives, being skewed heavily toward
one of the potential allocations, did not provide an adequate basis on which
differing viewpoints and issues could be focused. If comment was limited,
183. The methodology employed by the Forest Service employed a weighted set of "decisional
criteria" for analysis: I) resource outputs assigned each area by the Forest Service; 2) MU-SY
guidelines; 3) visitor accessibility; 4) landform features; 5) wildlife features; 6) ecosystems; 7)
Wilderness Attribute Rating System (WARS) rating, 690 F.2d at 765.
184. 690 F.2d at 767.
185. Id. at 768.
186. See supra note 119.
187. 40 C.F.R. §§ 1500-1517 (1982).
188. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14 (1982).
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insofar as direct allocation to wilderness, to a range of 6 percent to 33
percent, those advocating for a substantially greater percentage were left
with little to comment upon apart from presenting general disagreement
with the plan. NEPA's goal is to involve the public in a constructive
manner, and by so forcing some of the comments into an adversarial,
polarized stance, the Forest Service did not provide for this opportunity.
The CEQ regulations further state that all reasonable alternatives
should be "rigorously explore[d] and objectively evaluate[d].' 1 Those
alternatives identified, but excluded from detailed study should contain at
least a brief discussion of the reasons for their non-inclusion. The Forest
Service's error in Block was in not explaining why no more than 33 percent
of the evaluated areas were recommended for wilderness. There may be
valid reasons for such an allocation, but the Forest Service, in focusing such
explanation on the technical inputs, didn't adequately explain the alloca-
tion except by begging the question.
The ramification of this for the forest planning process is unclear, and
will most likely have to wait for judicial resolution. Nevertheless, several
suggestions can be gleaned from the case. First, there is the previously
discussed emphasis on the output of the planning process insofar as the
alternatives inquiry is concerned. Second, there is the court's view that any
skewed distribution of resource values is suspect, thus emphasizing an
equal valuation of resources identified in MU-SY. Finally, in evaluating
areas and recommending them for further use, the court intimated that the
present uses and values of a particular area should be weighted more than
potential uses so long as the general goal of the plan can be met.
To further insure the efficacy of the public participation process, the
final allocation in the plan must have some relevance to one of the
alternatives proposed. 190 If the decisionmaker were allowed, after receiv-
ing comment, to vary the plan substantially, the relevance of the comments
on the draft alternatives would be "seriously diluted". 191 The Forest
Service argues that it should be allowed some flexibility in shaping final
proposals for technical reasons, and also to be responsive to comments
received. The court agreed with this proposition to a limited extent, but felt
that the central concern of NEPA-that of identifying and internalizing
responsible opposing viewpoints, thus ensuring the decisionmakers' aware-
ness of the environmental trade-offs-limited that flexibility. 19 The test
applied involved a two-fold determination: 1) whether the selected alterna-
tive was within a range the public could have reasonably anticipated as
189. Id.
190. 690 F.2d at 769.
191. Id. at 772.
192. Id. at 771.
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being under consideration, and 2) whether some of the comments apply to
the chosen alternative in a manner to fully inform the decisionmaker of the
public's sentiment toward that particular allocation. 193 From a practical
perspective, this test should be easy to meet if the initial range of
alternatives proposed covered an adequate range of reasonable allocations.
But if they were limited or skewed from the beginning, the public's reaction
will be shaped by the proffered alternatives and any substantial change
puts into question where and how the comments were applied.
The current CEQ regulations 94 echo this view, requiring that the
"alternatives considered by the decisionmaker are encompassed by the
range of alternatives discussed", and that "the decisionmaker consider the
alternatives described in the environmental impact statement." Ulti-
mately, should comments or technical data suggest an allocation substan-
tially different than those discussed in initial statements, the agency will be
required to file a supplemental plan.195
The final challenge to the RARE II plan considered by the court
involved California's contention that the Forest Service inadequately
responded to the "site specific" comments received. These comments dealt
with particular sites within the programmatic plan. The Forest Service
contended that since the plan concerned the system as a whole, site specific
comments were not within the scope of this plan, but were more appropri-
ately considered on a forest-by-forest basis. This contention was rejected.
Since the effect of the plan was to recommend areas for inclusion in the
wilderness system, the consequence of non-inclusion was that the areas so
tagged were to be managed for values other than that of wilderness, and
potentially permanently excluded from further consideration for such. At
this stage, a "critical decision" was being made as to individual sites, 96 and
thus an individual evaluation was necessary. The argument of the Forest
Service amounted to a contention that, by broadening the scope of the plan,
requirements pertaining to specific sites could be avoided. With the
potential of irreversible commitment of those sites, such a procedure was
impermissible. 97 The requirements the court discussed in this respect, and
the policies underlying them, apply with equal force to forest planning
under NFMA.
The CEQ regulations in force at that time required that a "meaning-
ful reference" to comments be made in the response. 98 though that
193. Id. at 772.
194. 40 C.F.R. § 1505.1(e) (1982).
195. Id.Seealso690 F.2d at 770, 772; Natural Resources Defense Council v. Hughes, 437 F.
Supp. 981 (1977).
196. 690 F.2d at 761.
197. Id. at 765.
198. 40 C.F.R. § 1500.10(a) (1977) (superceded 1978).
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particular requirement has been deleted from the current regulations, 199
case law applying NEPA delineates the scope of this responsibility.
Generally, the scope of an agency's response to comments is determined by
the degree to which the comments bear "on the environmental effects of the
proposed action. °2 00 Again, this general language as to scope has been
deleted in the current regulations in favor of more specific directions.20 '
The new regulations are in consonance with the judicial interpretation of
this particular responsibility.
In responding to the comment process, the Forest Service is "obliged
to identify and discuss responsible opposing viewpoints. 20 2 Simple tabula-
tion of comments is insufficient; the response must identify the content of
these comments and be shaped accordingly.20 3 Additionally, to facilitate
review and demonstrate that such a process has occurred, the previous and
current regulations require that all substantive comments received be
appended to the final statement.20 The exception to this requirement is if
the response has been "exceptionally voluminous", then summaries are
deemed sufficient. Public response to the RARE II EIS totalled 85,258
letters, 76,831 petitions, and 101,549 response forms. The Forest Service
felt that providing "representative sample [s]" of the response satisfied the
requirements of the regulation. The court again disagreed. The ostensible
reason was that the sample failed to provide a "meaningful reference to all
responsible opposing viewpoints."2 °5 Although the current regulations do
not contain this requirement of a "meaningful reference", the policies
underlying NEPA are evident in the court's analysis. Fundamental to
NEPA is insuring that the decisionmaker[s] are aware of all relevant,
substantial points of view. This requires more than collection and 'empirical
199. See 40 C.F.R. 1503.4 (1982).
200. 690 F.2d at 773; 40 C.F.R. § 1500.10(a) (1977) (superceded 1978).
201. 40 C.F.R. 1503.4 (1982) states:
"(a) An agency preparing a final environmental impact statement shall assess and consider
comments both individually and collectively, and shall respond by one or more of the means
listed below, stating its response in the final statement. Possible responses act to: I) Modify
alternatives including the proposed action; 2) Develop and evaluate alternatives not given
serious consideration by the agency; 3) Make factual corrections; 4) Explain why the
comments do not warrant further response, citing the sources, authorities, or reasons which
support the agency's position and, if appropriate, indicate those circumstances which would
trigger agency reappraisal or further response."
202. 690 F.2d at 773.
203. Id.
204. 40 C.F.R. § 1510.10(a) (1977) and 40 C.F.R. 1503.4(b) state:
All substantive comments received on the draft statement (or summaries thereof where the
response has been exceptionally voluminous) should be attached to a final statement
whether or not the comment is thought to merit individual discussion by the agency in the
text of the statement."
205. 690 F.2d at 773.
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categorization of issues commented upon, but that each comment should
be considered on its own merits, responded to and summarized in that
manner. Implicit within this view is a recognition of the probability that
two different comments may reach the same conclusion, but based on
different reasons. It is thus the reasoning behind each conclusion that must
be articulated to the decisionmaker in order to fully comply with NEPA.
This is necessary to realize NEPA's goal that the participation process
amounts to more than a mere plebiscite, but a rational discussion between
the public and the decisionmaker.
The import of Block and other NEPA decisions is that agencies must
go further than merely allowing for an opportunity to comment and
collecting those comments made. The "information exchange" function of
public participation is clearly the baseline reason for such activity, but, for
several reasons, agencies are required to go further in the treatment of
input. It is clear that even for the validity of that function to be inviolate, it
is necessary to insure first that the information was presented to the
decisionmaker, and second, that it was considered. 0 6 Without these two
elements even the informational value of input is subject to question. The
requirements of documentation and consideration are instrumental in
showing the public, and the courts, that the decisionmaker was indeed
confronted with the maximum possible relevant information, and that
parochial policy choices had been identified.
A second value is implicated in the NEPA process. In this respect, the
primary goal of NEPA is to assure better policy choices. The provision of a
supplemental decisionmaker (the courts) to pursue this goal, in part based
on public input, argues strongly for a broader accountability/socio-
political role for participation. The narrow "information" perspective is
based on the hope that added input will yield better policy. If that were the
only expectation judicial review would be less important. The acceptance
of such review recognizes that in spite of all possible information, the
decisionmaker can, and will (according to the pluralist diagnosis of
bureaucratic action) make a parochial choice, or one contrary to the weight
of evidence. The requirement that an agency show and consider all relevant
sides of a policy decision, and then make a case for its final choice, lessens
the potential for skewed results,20 7 and provides evidence for identifying
those that are. Additionally, the potential judicial reversal of completed
plans provides a powerful incentive to make the plan demonstrably fair and
in consonance with the statutory mandates. Again, it must be emphasized
that often there is no clear best choice in these matters. Requiring a
206. See Achterman, supra note 98, at 530; 590 F.2d 773.
207. See supra note 158, and accompanying text.
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demonstration of the effect of input infuses the process with an atmosphere
more conducive to recognizing and seeking the public good, and less likely
to be subject to particular constraints. This is, in a sense, one of the
fundamental "why's" of public participation; the provision of a more
comprehensive institutional structure that provides the decisionmaker
with a better idea of values outside his/her specific institutional role.
B. Does NFMA Require More?
At this point it should be apparent that NEPA provides a substantial
model of public participation for the planning process. The question
remains though whether or not NFMA adds to or requires more than
NEPA. As pointed out before, most statutes leave much to be desired when
it comes to determining the role of participation in the particular process
involved, and NFMA is no exception. At best, several questions can be
raised.
First, if it is accepted that NEPA does require a demonstration of the
consideration and effect of public input, the question is posed whether the
incorporation by reference of NEPA is sufficient to satisfy NFMA. In that
respect, NFMA directs the Secretary to "promulgate regulations" that
"shall include, but not be limited to: 1) specifying procedures to insure that
land management plans are prepared in accordance with [NEPA]. '"208
This requirement, read strictly, would suggest that explicit, separate
regulations in consonance with NEPA are necessary. From a practical
standpoint, to so do would lead to less confusion within the agency on
coordinating various regulatory chapters, greater clarity of action, and
ultimately, less litigation over alleged non-compliance. One of the goals of
the Task Force revisions was to minimize duplication in federal regula-
tions, thereby streamlining and insuring more efficient government action.
In this respect, the revision must then provide a margin of benefit from
decreased duplication and increased efficiency to offset the potential costs
engendered by such a change. It is not entirely clear that the route chosen is
the best one. The error made in this instance is in the assumption that
shorter regulations necessarily are more accurate and efficient than longer,
more comprehensive ones. It is plausible that reference to a single, uniform
body of regulations (NEPA) will provide for more consistent action in the
long run. The NEPA regulations, although deferred to by the courts, are
not the definitive source of NEPA's requirements; often the courts will go
further. It would seem desirable then to provide in the regulations the most
accurate description of settled case law available; in particular when the
regulatory clause in question is a fundamental guideline type such as
208. Supra note 11.
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deleted here. This is most important when it is realized that the implemen-
tation of the planning regulations is most often left to non-lawyers, and that
even for lawyers the complex milieu of NEPA law is often undecipherable.
The intent guidelines thus are important; at the very least they provide
a general direction to agency personnel, influencing attitudes and ap-
proaches to the process. A well meaning and strict adherence to the revised
regulations may engender a participation process and product that does not
demonstrate in a legally sufficient manner how such input was considered.
This would lead to challenges and litigation, and be contrary to the goal of
increased efficiency in the government process.
The question remains of whether NFMA requires more by way of
public participation in the planning process than the base line requirement
of NEPA. NFMA, again, is vague on this point. Several matters argue for
a stronger model. The Forest Service must present plans at places and in a
form that "fosters public participation."20 9 NFMA was passed as a
reaction to traditional Forest Service practice, and intended to correct
them. At the time of the NFMA debates NEPA was already a strong body
of law applicable to Forest Service planning activities.21 0 Acceptance of
NEPA was strongly implicit within the NFMA debates.
Additionally, as discussed before, all proposed amendments pertain-
ing to increased participation in the planning process were accepted in the
Congressional debates, and the general intent was that "land management
planning. . .shall be accomplished with improved opportunity for public
participation at all levels. 211 Whether this "improved opportunity" was
based on previous Forest Service practices, or the NEPA model, is the
unanswered question. Also noteworthy is that Congress saw fit to provide
explicitly for public participation in certain management actions under
NFMA. Perhaps this was an effort to remove the question of whether these
actions, departures and clearcutting,212 are "major federal actions" under
NEPA; but it appears in any respect that Congress saw the need to provide
this check at every important stage in the planning-management process.
This recognition of the importance of participation, and the values it brings
to the decisionmaking process cannot be deemphasized. NFMA should be
read as implementing the NEPA model fully, and thus any challenges to
that model in the forest planning process should be carefully scrutinized.
IV. CONCLUSION
The previous discussions have hopefully articulated the importance of
209. Supra note 27.
210. Supra note 179.
211. Supra note 65.
212. Supra note 27.
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fostering and protecting a strong model of public participation. When it is
realized that public forests have traditionally been managed for a domi-
nant resource, and that congressional mandates have been, for the most
part, ineffective in changing that orientation, it is apparent that some other
method of providing for a representative check on Forest Service activities
is needed. An open and participatory decisionmaking process is one such
method.
While the changes in the NFMA regulations may be defensible from
the standpoint of the goal of regulatory reform, the loss of explicit citation
to one of the accepted purposes of public participation; moving the resource
allocation process one step (albeit, small) from public scrutiny, may
actually work contrary to some of the goals for that reform. The regulations
should encourage and endorse public participation, and thus be in
consonance with NEPA. Regulations which do not include this affirmative
mandate will decrease accountability. Furthermore, less comprehensive
regulations provide substantial latitude for interpretation, and as a result
will invite challenge, and inevitable litigation.
Most importantly, the circumstances under which current resource
decisions are made make it imperative that informed, comprehensive
consideration be given to the benefits, costs, and consequences of manage-
ment decisions. The implementation of Forest Plans will often facilitate an
irretrievable commitment of some resources. The trust responsibility
which we have vested in our present day resource decisionmakers argues
strongly for no less than a full effort to reach the wisest of all possible
decisions, and to preclude those that are parochial or which will impose
unfair costs on future generations. 13
213. The Forest Service has reacted to the holding in California v. Block by proposing an
amendment to 36 C.F.R. 219.17, which concerns the evaluation of roadless areas in the forest planning
process. Most pertinent is that; "Under the proposed rule, information analysis and public participa-
tion, in addition to that available from RARE II and other sources would be developed for each area
that is subject to evaluation to minimize the risk that any future legal challenges based on California v.
Block will occur." The proposed rule, in pertinent part, reads, "(2) For each area subject to evaluation
under paragraph (1) (1) of this section, (which makes wilderness classification evaluation a part of the
forest planning process, ed.) the evaluation, and the determination of the appropriate detail and scope
of evaluation, shall be developed with public participation." 48 Fed. Reg. 16505 (April 18, 1983).
Although the proposed rule shows the Forest Service's concern with complying with California v. Block
in regards to participation-commenting on the allocation of specific sites, it appears the Forest Service
did not feel it necessary to propose regulatory amendments to comply with Block's affirmative
participation mandate. Whether the Forest Service feels its present policies are in accord with Block, or
that Block doesn't mandate more "meaningful" participation, remains to be seen.
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